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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
man's compensation law were a part of the community.'l In reaching the
same result, Californiat and Texas' 2 considered the benefits as awarded in
lieu of wages.
Louisiana, alone, has held that the benefits are not a part of the com-
munity.1 3 The court concluded that the purpose of the statute is to provide a
means of subsistence to the employee while his earning capacity has been
partially or wholly destroyed by injury received in the course of his em-
ployment.
Division of property has been defined in a separate property state as an
adjustment of property rights and equities between the parties and is clearly
distinguishable in purpose from alimony and support money which may also
b6 granted.14 In the instant case the defendant, 65 years of age, was per-
manently disabled. The plaintiff was a stenographer and bookkeeper, in
good health, and employed at the time of the suit. If these same facts should
arise in a separate property state it appears that the wife would have little
success in attempting to impound any part of the benefits awarded the hus-
band by the workman's compensation act.
North Dakota has held that the ultimate object to be sought in property
division in a divorce action is an equitable distribution" depending upon
factsi and circumstances.' Our code substantially reiterates this precept 17 and
provides with respect to workman's compensation awards that the payments
shall go to the employee and only on his death to his dependents."
Should North Dakota, not being a community property state, have to deal
with a property settlement such as that in the instant case, the compensation
awards of the husband would merely be taken into consideration along with
his other assets when making a property settlement or alimony decree.
FRED E. WHISENAND Jn.
HOMIICIDE - MURDER - THE FELONY-MURDER RULE - Defendant and his
accomplice fled after robbing a store. The storekeeper pursued the accomp-
lice and killed him. Upon defendant's trial for the murder of his accomplice
it was held that a co-felon can be found guilty of murder of his accomplice
under the felony murder rule' where the victim of an armed robbery justifi-
10. Dawson v. McNaney, 71 Ariz. 79, 223 P.2d 907 (1950).
11. Northwestern Redwood Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n., 184 Cal. 484, 194
Pac. 31 (1920); Doyle v. Doyle, 44 Cal. App. 259, 186 Pac. 188, 190 (1919) (dictum).
12. Pickens v. Pickens, 125 Tex. 410, 83 S.W.2d 951 (1935).
13. Brownfield v. Southern Amusement Co., 196 La. 74, 198 So. 656 (1940).
14. Brackob v. Brackob, 262 Wis. 202, 54 N.W.2d 900, 903 (1952).
15. Ruff v. Ruff, 78 N.D. 775, 52 N.W.2d 107 (1952).
16. Id. at 784, 52 N.W.2d at 111 (such as the respective ages of the parties, earning
ability, conduct of the parties, station in life, health and physical condition, 5nancial cir-
cunstances as shown by their property, and all other matters pertaining to the case).
17. N. D. Rev. Code §14-0524 (1943): "When a divorce is granted, the court shall
make such equitable distribution of the real and personal property of the parties as :nay
seem just and' proper, and may compel either of the parties to provide for the mainten-
ance of the children of the marriage, and to make such suitable allowances to the other
party for support during life or for a shorter period as the court may deem just, having
regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively. The court from time to time may
modify its orders in these respects."
18. N. D. Rev. Code §65-0505 (1943).
1. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §4701 (1939): "All murder . . . which shall be committed
in the perpetration of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson, rape, burglary, or kidnap-
ping, shall be murder in the first degree."
RECENT CASES 141
ably kills the other felon as he leaves the scene of the crime. Commonwealth
v. Thomas 117 Atl.2d 204 (Pa. 1955).
Restating the common law felony murder rule, it has been said: "Malice
was implied as a matter of law in every case of homicide while engaged in the
comnission of some other felony, and such a killing was murder whether death
was intended or not. The mere fact that the party was engaged in the com-
mission of a felony was regarded as sufficient to apply the element of malice."2
Inherent in the application of the rule is the use of the fiction that the malice
of the initial offense attaches itself to whatever else the criminal might do. :
The probability that injustice would result from the fictitious transfer of malice
seemed remote because at common law practically all felonies were punishable
by death, 4 and it was considered immaterial whether a man was hanged for
one felony or another.5
Virtually every jurisdiction in the United States has adopted some statu-
tory form of the felony murder rule.,; Most of these statutes are similar to the
Pennsylvania statute applied in the instant case in that only specified felonies
are included.7 Those usually designated are arson, rape, robbery and burglary8
Any homicide committed in the perpetration of any of the enumerated felonies
is, by statute, declared first degree murder. 9 Premeditation is implied by law
(as was malice under common law) and actual intent is immaterial. 1 °
Strict enforcement of the felony murder rule has led to some harsh, inequit-
able results,"1 particularly in cases concerning accomplices who in no way
participated in or condoned the homicide.12 The rule is, in effect, a conclusive
presumption of a malicious intent to kill,13 and it has been criticized as being
archaic, unrealistic and completely inflexible.14
The instant case represents a unique application of the felony murder rule,
to a killing perpetrated by an innocent party in an attempt to thwart a felony.
Precedent for finding the felons guilty of murder under these circumstances
is found in two recent Pennsylvania cases, Commonwealth v. Moyer15 and
Commonwealth v. Almedia.16 In each of those cases defenders mistakenly
2. Clark and Marshall, Crimes 298 (3rd ed. 1927). See also Wharton, Homicide 38
(1875).
3. People v. Luscomb, 292 N.Y. 390, 55 N.E.2d 469,472 (1944) (dictum).
4. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 413, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901) (dictum).
5. Ibid.
6. For an exhaustive survey of the various state statutes see 20 Corn. L. Q. 288.
7. N. D. Rev. Code §12-2712 (1943): "Every murder perpetrated . . . in commit-
ting or attempting to commit any sodomy, rape, mayhem, arson, robbery or burglary, is
murder in the first degree." Ibid.
8. See note 6 supra.
9. People v. Osborn, 37 Cal.2d 380, 231 P.2d 850 (1951); People v. Lindley, 26 Cal.
2d 780, 161 P.2d 227 (1945); People v. Sutton, 17 Cal. App.2d 561, 62 P.2d 397
(1909); People v. Page, 198 Mich. 524, 165 N.W. 755 (1917); State v. Rogers, 233
N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951).
10. Ibid.
11. See State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 50 S.W.2d 1049 (1932) (Defendant com-
mitted arson in burning his building to collect insurance. While fighting the fire, one of
the firemen was accidentally killed. Defendant was convicted. of first degree murder under
the Missouri felony murder statute).
12. See People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App.2d 52, 87 P.2d 364 (1939) (A robber killed
one of his conspirators as they were about to carry out their plan to commit a felony. All
of the conspirators, though they did not contribute to the death were convicted of xirst
degree murder under the statute).
13. Rhea v. State, 63 Nebr. 461, 88 N.W. 789 (1902).
14. See Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-Murder Rule, 1952 Wash. U. L. Q. 191
( 1952).
15. 357 Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947).
16. 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949).
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killed innocent parties and first degree murder convictions were obtained
against the felons under the felony murder statute.1 7 The Pennsylvania court,
in reaching this anomaly, reasons that if one or more felons set in motion a
chain of circumstances out of which death ensues, the felons should ipso
facto be held guilty of premeditated murder under the statute, regardless of
the actual cause of death and the intention of the parties. Such a rationale
extends the felony murder rule far beyond the bounds to which it is restricted
in other jurisdictions.
Apparently all other jurisdictions that have litigated this question oppose the
Pennsylvania interpretation and apply the rule only when the homicide is,
committed by a felon.' 8 Although not expressly so provided, it is implicit in
the wording of the typical statute that the killing must be done by a felon or
his accomplice.2 ° Most jurisdictions have no cases in point, probably because
of a generally accepted assumption that felony murder statutes should he so
construed. Indeed, a Pennsylvania case prior to those discussed above seems
to have proceeded on the basis of such an assumption."'
The majority view is represented by the case of Butler v. People,"' where
the court said: "No person can be held responsible for a homicide unless the
act was either actually or constructively committed by him. In order to be his
act it must be committed by his hand, or by someone acting in concert with
him, or in furtherance of a common design or purpose."
It is also implicit in the construction of the felony murder rule that the
'homicide occur in the execution and furtherance of the initial crime.2 2 In
this case it resulted from an act in direct opposition to the common design of
the defendant and the deceased. It is difficult to see how by any stretch of the
imagination one could construe this as a malicious act of the defendant. :1
The unjustified extension of the felony murder rule in this case becomes
further apparent when one realizes the homicide was clearly justifiable, 2 4 and
that such killings carry the sanction of society. It would appear then that thc
defendant has been ordered to pay a non-existing debt to society. Some felony
17. See note 1 supra.
18. See People v. Ferlin, 203 Cal. 587, 265 Pac. 230 (1928); People v. Garippo, 292
Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Butler v. People, 125 I11. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Com-
monwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89
Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863).
19. See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 321 Pa. 327, 184 Atl. 97 (1936).
20. N. D. Rev. Code §12-2712 (1943): "Every murder perpetrated . . . in committing
or attempting to commit any sodomy, rape, mayhem, arson, robbery or burglary, is "nurder
in the first degree." (Emphasis added).
21. 125 111. 641, 18 N.E. 338, 339 (1888).
22. See People v. Ryan, 263 N.Y. 298, 189 N.E. 225 (1934).
23. In Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 541 (1863), the court :;tated:
"Certainly that cannot be said to he an act of a party in any just sense, or on any sound
legal principal, which is not Qnly not done by him, or by anyone with whom he is associated
or connected in a common enterprise, or in attempting to accomplish the same end, but fs
committed by a person who is his direct and immediate adversary, and who is, at ;he
moment when the alleged criminal act is done, actually engaged in opposing and resisting
him and his confederates and abettors in the accomplishment of the unlawful object :or
which they are united.".
24. See Clark and Marshall, Crimes 338 (3rd ed. 1927): "It is a well settled prin-
ciple of the common law that any person, whether he be a peace officer or merely a private
individual, may and should kill another, if necessary to prevent him from committing' a
felony attempted by force or surprise, as murder, rape, sodomy, robbery, burglary or arson.
The homicide in such a case is not merely excusable, but it is jutifiable.".
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murder statutes specifically exempt justifiable and excusable homicide25 It
seems that such an exemption should be implied in the Pennsylvania law.
The extreme position of the Pennsylvania court in the principal case is
regrettable. It appears to be an unreasonable extension of an already un-
reasonable rule, and the anticipated effect would be to stamp as murderers
all felons who are remotely associated with a homicide in the course of com-
mitting their felonious act. Such a result is obviously unjust and entirely
lacking in logic. The desire to discourage the occurence of felonies is un-
questionably a highly commendable motive, but in selecting a means to that
end, the courts should never cease to temper their decisions with logical reason-
ing, where the legislative mandate permits.
GEORGE DYNES
INSURANCE - ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY - VALIDITY OF ORAL ASSIGNMENT -
The plaintiff's husband obtained an insurance policy on his life, named his wife
as beneficiary, and delivered the policy to her. He later took possession of the
policy without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent and substituted his sister,
the defendant, as beneficiary. Upon her husband's death the plaintiff sought
to have herself declared the beneficiary of the policy, alleging an executed oral
agreement under which she was to be named beneficiary in return for the
payment by her of the premiums. On appeal from a summary judgment dis-
missing the complaint, the court held that a cause of action was stated. An
oral agreement to name a beneficiary, plus manual delivery of the policy with
intent to make a gift, amounted to a valid and enforceable assignment of the
policy; that this assignment was not within the statute of frauds; and that a
constructive tnst resulted for the benefit of the plaintiff. Katzman v. Aetna
Life Insurance Co., 137 N.Y.S.2d 583, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955).
Generally, full performance will take an oral agreement out of the statute
ef frauds,1 provided it is established by clear proof.2 The statute may not be
successfully interposed as a defense in equity where it would aid in the
perpetration of a fraud,3 or in cases involving parol 4 or constructive) trusts.
A parol assignment of an insurance policy does not fall within the statute
whether made as a giftG or for consideration. Delivery, which is essential to
25. N. Y. Penal Law §1044, (1950): "The killing of a human being, unless it is ex-
cusable or justifiable, is murder in the first degree, when committed . . . by a person ,:n-
gaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony, either upon or affecting
the person killed or otherwise." (Emphasis added).
1. Jones v. Jones, 333 Mo. 478, 63 S.W.2d 146 (1933); Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 34 N.Y.
S.2d 674, 677 (1942), aff'd. 47 N.E.2d 959 (1943); Considine v. Considine, 7 N. Y. S.2d.
834 (1938); Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273 (1922) (Part perform-
ance is insufficient unless it is unequivocally referable to ihe agreement).
2. Accord Stolar v. Turner, 237. Iowa 593, 21 N.W.2d 544 (1946).
3. Fleming v. Dillon, 370 Ill. 325, 18 N.E.2d. 910 (1938); Keystone Hardware Corp.
v. Tague, 245 N.Y. 79, 158 N.E. "27- (1927) (Plaintiff-vendee not permitted to plead
statute of frauds in action to recover purchase price under oral contract to convey land
where defendant-vendor was willing to convey).
4. Blanco v. Velez, 295 N.Y. 224, 66 N.E.2d. 171 (1946).
5. Latham v. Fr. Divine, 299 N.Y. 22, 85 N.E.2d. 168 (1949); Bogart on Trusts,
§56 (2d ed. 1942) (The constructive trust, created in equity, may be based upon oral
evidence).
6. Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Sailor, 47 F.2d 911 (S.D. Cal. 1930); See Cooney v.
Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 235 Minn. 377, 51 N.W.2d. 285 (1952); John Hancock Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Sandrisser, 95 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1950); Young v. Prudential Ins. Co., 131 N.Y.S.
968 (1911).
